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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction in accordance with an order of this Court dated 
February 14, 2008, granting certiorari pursuant to Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(5) (2002) renumbered as Utah Code § 78A-3-
102(5) by 2008 Utah Laws Ch. 3 (H.B. 78 (effective February 7, 2008). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
This Court granted certiorari in this case to review the following two limited 
issues: 
1. Whether the court of appeals correctly construed and applied relevant 
provisions of the Utah Revised Limited Liability Company Act in holding that the district 
court could extend the period for rejecting Petitioner's claim 
2. Whether the court of appeals erred in affirming the district court's award of 
attorney fees and in imposing fees for the appeal. 
This Court did not agree to review the ruling of the court of appeals that the 
Petitioner's claim was barred as a matter of law by both the Utah statute of frauds and 
Utah's broker licensing statutes. Thus, the decision of the court of appeals on these 
issues constitutes a final judicial determination. 
Standard of Review 
"On certiorari review, this court reviews the decision of the court of appeals, not 
the decision of the district court." Ellsworth Paulsen Const Co. v. 51-SPR-L.L.C, 2008 
UT 28, — P.3d —, 2008 WL 926586, t l 12-13. Where, as here, the court of appeals 
reviewed the district court's grant of a motion for summary judgment, the supreme court 
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accords no particular deference to the ruling of the court of appeals but reviews it for 
correctness. Id. However, this Court may affirm the result reached by the court of 
appeals on any ground. Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, f 10, 52 P.3d 1158 (an appellate 
court may affirm a judgment on "any legal ground or theory apparent on the record"). 
As to the award of attorney fees, "[w]hether the trial court properly interpreted the 
legal prerequisites for awarding attorney fees under section 78-27-56 is a question of law 
that [this court] review[s] . . . for correctness. The question of whether, under the second 
prerequisite of section 78-27-56, a claim was brought in bad faith is a question of fact 
[that] [this Court] reviews . . . under a clearly erroneous standard." Still Standing Stable, 
LLC v. Allen, 2005 UT 46, 122 P.3d 556, K 8. 
STATUTES 
Resolution of the issues on which the Court granted certiorari requires 
consideration of the following statutes and rule. 
I. Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-1305(1) provides: 
A dissolved company in winding up may dispose of the known claims against it by 
following the procedures described in this section. 
II. Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-1212 provides: 
(1) A court in a judicial proceeding brought to dissolve a company may, at any 
time before entering a decree of dissolution, appoint one or more custodians to 
manage the business and affairs of the company until further order of the court and 
may, upon or after entering a decree dissolving the company, appoint one or more 
receivers to wind up and liquidate the business and affairs of the company. The 
court shall hold a hearing, after giving notice to all parties to the proceeding and 
any interested persons designated by the court, before appointing a receiver or a 
custodian. The court appointing a receiver or custodian has exclusive jurisdiction 
over the company and all of its property wherever located. 
(2) The court may appoint any person or the court may require the receiver or 
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custodian to post bond, with or without sureties, in an amount the court directs. 
(3) The court shall describe the powers and duties of the receiver or custodian in 
its appointing order, which may be amended from time to time. Among other 
powers: 
(a) the receiver: 
(i) may dispose of all or any part of the assets of the company wherever 
located, at a public or private sale, if authorized by the court; and 
(ii) may sue and defend in its own name as receiver of the company in all 
courts of this state; or 
(b) the custodian may exercise all of the powers of the company, through or in 
place of its members or managers, to the extent necessary to manage the affairs of 
the company in the best interests of its members and creditors. 
(4) The court during a receivership may redesignate the receiver a custodian, and 
during a custodianship may redesignate the custodian a receiver, if doing so is in 
the best interests of the company, its members, and its creditors. 
(5) The court from time to time during the receivership or custodianship may order 
compensation paid and expense disbursements or reimbursements made to the 
receiver or custodian and the custodian's or receiver's counsel from the assets of 
the company or proceeds from the sale of the assets. 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4 provides in pertinent part: 
The following agreements are void unless the agreement, or some note or 
memorandum of the agreement, is in writing, signed by the party to be charged 
with the agreement: 
(5) every agreement authorizing or employing an agent or broker to purchase or 
sell real estate for compensation. 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-18(2) states: 
No sales agent or associate broker may sue in his own name for the recovery of a 
fee, commission, or compensation for services as a sales agent or associate broker 
unless the action is against the principal broker with whom he is or was licensed. 
Any action for the recovery of a fee, commission, or other compensation may only 
be instituted and brought by the principal broker with whom the sales agent or 
associate broker is affiliated. 
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V. Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 provides: 
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing 
party if the court determines that the action or defense to the action was without 
merit and not brought or asserted in good faith. 
VI. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(g) provides in relevant part: 
If any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are presented in bad faith or 
solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order the party presenting 
them to pay to the other party the amount of the reasonable expenses which the 
filing of the affidavits caused, including reasonable attorney's fees. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This case arises from the judicial dissolution proceeding of Olympus Construction, 
L.C. ("Olympus"). The appellee and respondent in this case is Annette W. Jarvis, the 
court-appointed receiver of Olympus (the "Receiver")- The appellant and petitioner is 
David C. Matthews ("Matthews"). Matthews is a real estate agent, now inactive, who 
claims that he is entitled to a real estate commission from Olympus on the basis of an 
alleged oral agreement. It is undisputed this claim is barred by both the statute of frauds 
and by Utah's broker licensing statutes, and since certiorari was not granted on these 
issues, there has been a final judicial determination. In addition, all four judges who have 
reviewed this matter to date have concluded that Matthews's claim was without merit. 
Furthermore, Matthews filed a false claim under penalty of perjury and supported his 
meritless claim with false affidavits. He also filed perjurious discovery responses. After 
the Receiver established the falsity of the affidavits, Matthews changed his story and filed 
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additional false affidavits. Matthews's own false affidavit in this case has never been 
corrected. 
Because his Claim was barred by law, Matthews seized on a perceived technicality 
in the Limited Liability Company Act to argue that his false claim had to be "considered 
approved." However, as explained below, the statutory provision upon which Matthews 
relies is permissive, and it was not adopted by the district court. 
Course of Proceedings 
In 2002, a petition for the dissolution of Olympus was filed with the Third Judicial 
District Court. R. 1. The district court appointed a receiver to wind up the affairs of 
Olympus. R. 586, 589. The Receiver subsequently obtained from the court orders 
establishing (1) a claims bar date, (2) a claims filing procedure, and then, after claims had 
been filed, initially reviewed, and settlement possibilities explored, (3) a claims 
resolution procedure. R. 843, 2085. 
In 2004, Matthews filed his claim form with the district court pursuant to the 
claims bar date and claims filing procedure (the "Claim" or the "Matthews Claim"). 
Matthews alleged—based upon an alleged 1998 oral contract—that he was personally 
entitled to a real estate commission from Olympus in the amount of $100,000.* R. 968. 
In response to the Receiver's motion for an order establishing a claims resolution 
procedure to resolve all claims filed in the receivership, R. 1021., Matthews filed a motion 
with the district court arguing that because the Receiver had not rejected his meritless 
1
 It is undisputed that (1) a lesser amount was listed in the written real estate documents 
attached to Matthews's claim form as his supporting documentation, and (2) that the 
amount listed in the written documents was in fact paid to Matthews's broker. 
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Claim within ninety days of its filing, his Claim had to be "considered approved" and had 
to be paid in full regardless of whether or not the Claim was proper. R. 1044. 
Disposition Below 
The district court denied Matthews's motion to pay his claim and held that 
Matthews's Claim should be adjudicated in accordance with the claims resolution 
procedure proposed by the Receiver and subsequently adopted by the court. R. 2145. In 
accordance with procedures adopted by the court, the Receiver objected to Matthews5s 
Claim. R. 2147. The Receiver then filed a motion seeking summary judgment to 
disallow the Matthews Claim because it is barred by (1) the statute of frauds and (2) Utah 
real estate statutes. R. 2647. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of 
the Receiver. R. 3037. The Receiver also sought an award of attorney fees from 
Matthews, R. 2986, and the district court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law 
with respect to the attorney fee issue. R. 3122. Then, the district court entered its order 
granting attorney fees to the Receiver. R. 3155. Matthews appealed, R. 3320, and the 
court of appeals affirmed the decision of the district court on both the merits and on the 
issue of attorney fees. 2007 UT App 361, 173 P.3d 192. Matthews then filed a petition 
for a writ of certiorari with this Court, and this Court agreed to review two narrow 
aspects of the ruling of the court of appeals. 
Statement of Facts 
The Dissolution of Olympus 
1. On or about January 31, 2002, a Petition for Judicial Dissolution of 
Olympus was filed with the district court. R. 1. 
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2. On August 20, 2002, the court entered an Order of Decree of Judicial 
Dissolution and Conversion of Custodian into Receiver (the "Order of Dissolution"). R. 
589. Pursuant to the Order of Dissolution, the district court appointed a receiver and 
granted the receiver "the normal and customary powers of a receiver." IdL On May 5, 
2003, the court entered its Stipulated Order Approving Successor Receiver ("Successor 
Receiver Order"), appointing Annette W. Jarvis as the Successor Receiver. 
3. The Successor Receiver Order provides, in relevant part: 
2. . . . As Receiver, Ms. Jarvis shall wind up the business and affairs of 
Olympus as provided in Part 13 of the Utah Limited Liability Company Act, and 
shall exercise all of the powers of a receiver of a limited liability company 
provided for by law or equity, except as her powers may be specifically 
circumscribed or expanded by the terms of this Order or any subsequent order of 
the Court 
4. Except as otherwise provided herein the Receiver may dispose of 
known and unknown claims against Olympus by notice and/or publication, may 
set dates for the barring of such claims and may accept or reject claims all as 
provided in Utah Code Ann. Sections 48-2c-1305 and 1306. To the extent 
permitted by law, all claims filed against Olympus shall be adjudicated and 
determined by this Court in and as part of this proceeding. The Receiver may 
petition the Court, and the Court may order, expedited procedures for the 
adjudication and determination of claims, as may be appropriate and necessary 
for the prompt determination of claims. 
12. Nothing in this Order shall prevent the Receiver from requesting 
augmentation, modification, or supplementation of her powers as Receiver to the 
full extent permitted by law or equity upon further application to the Court and 
after notice and a hearing. 
Id. at Iff 2, 4, 12 (emphasis added). 
The Establishment of Procedures by the District Court 
4. Pursuant to her authority under the Successor Receiver Order, the Receiver 
filed a motion with the district court seeking to establish a claims bar date and a claims 
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filing procedure, with a memorandum in support thereof. R. 791-835. Copies of the 
motion and memorandum were served on Matthews. Id. 
5. The supporting memorandum clearly stated that the Receiver would later 
file a motion to establish a claims adjudication process. R. 797 at \ 12. 
6. Despite having received a notice of the motion and accompanying 
memorandum, neither Matthews nor any other party filed an objection to the motion for a 
bar date and claims filing procedure, and on February 26, 2004, the court entered its 
Order Granting Receiver's Motion for Declaratory Relief and Establishing a Claim Bar 
Date and a Claim Filing Procedure (the "Bar Date Order"). R. 843. 
7. The Bar Date Order established June 30, 2004, as "the bar date for all 
claims to be filed against Olympus5 receivership estate," and further provided that "to the 
extent creditor claims are not timely filed, they will be forever barred." Id. at Tf 3. The 
Bar Date Order also approved the form and manner of written notice to be provided to 
known creditors, the form and manner of publication notice to be provided to all 
creditors, and the procedures by which creditors were to file their notices of claim against 
the Receivership Estate. R. 864 at Tf 36. The Bar Date Order did not address how claims 
filed pursuant to the Bar Date Order were to be resolved, see id, nor did the Bar Date 
Order include any provision for the automatic allowance of claims. Indeed, the Bar Date 
Order did not even reference section 1305. Rather, the order states: "[T]he filing of a 
claim by a creditor against Olympus does not necessarily mean that it will be allowed. 
The Receiver . . . reserves the right to file an objection to all or a portion of any filed 
claim. Id. at f 4(D). 
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8. On June 30, 2004, Matthews filed his Claim, asserting that he had a claim 
in his own name for services he rendered to Olympus in connection with the acquisition 
of real estate on or about December 3, 1998. R. 968. 
9. Thereafter, and in accordance with the statement made in her motion for a 
claims bar date and a claims filing procedure, the Receiver filed a motion on November 
18, 2004, for approval of claims resolution procedures. R. 1021-1038. 
10. Matthews responded to the Receiver's motion for the establishment of 
claim resolution procedures by filing his motion for an order requiring payment of his 
claim in which he argued that his claim was "considered approved" pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 48-2c-1305(4). R. 1044. Matthews also formally and simultaneously 
opposed the approval of the claims resolution procedures. R. 1047. 
11. On March 16, 2005, the district court entered an order establishing a claims 
resolution procedure (the "Claims Resolution Order"). R. 2085. 
12. On March 29, 2005, the district court denied Matthews's motion for an 
order requiring the Receiver to pay his claim. R. 2145. The district court specifically 
indicated that Matthews's claim would be resolved "in accordance with the Claim 
Resolution Procedure approved by the Court." Id. Thus, the district court ruled that the 
provisions of section 48-2c-1305 were permissive, and that the Receiver was entitled to 
have all of the claims against Olympus—including the Matthews Claim—adjudicated on 
the merits. In reaching its decision on this point, the district court was interpreting its 
own earlier order, and the district court found that its order establishing a bar date was 
not an order adopting the procedures of section 1305. 
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Adjudication of the Matthews Claim 
13. On July 6, 2005, the Receiver filed a motion for summary judgment, asking 
the district court to disallow Matthews's claim on the grounds that it was barred by the 
statute of frauds and by Utah's real estate statutes.2 R. 2647. 
14. The trial court granted summary judgment on December 20,2005. R. 
3037. 
The Basis for an Award of Attorney Fees 
15. On June 125 2006, the district court entered its findings of fact and 
conclusions of law with respect to the Receiver's motion for attorney fees. R. 3122. The 
district court made the following factual findings: 
A. Matthews signed the Matthews Claim on June 7, 2004, and filed the 
claim in this Receivership case on June 30, 2004. 
The two summary judgment grounds asserted by the Receiver are not the only bases on 
which relief may be granted disallowing the Matthews Claim. For example, the 
Matthews Claim, R. 968, does not set forth that his right to entitlement is by virtue of 
assignment, R. 2883-2884 ^[ 11-12, which would make it facially defective, or that as of 
the date of dissolution Matthews's right was contingent on a sale of the property by the 
Receiver, and thus not matured R. 2883-28841 8. Although Matthews relies on 
subsection 48-2c-l305(4) to support his "considered approved" argument, he ignores his 
own argument that his right to the alleged commission matured after the effective date of 
dissolution which is not within the definition of a "claim" under subsection 48-2c-
1305(6), but is within the broader definition of claim set forth in the Bar Date Order and 
Notice of Claim form. In other words, Matthews cannot have it both ways. If all of the 
provisions of section 1305 must be applied literally notwithstanding the alternative, more 
tailored procedures adopted by the district court in this case, Matthews does not have a 
claim under the statute that can either be allowed or disallowed. 
10 
B. Pursuant to the Matthews Claim, Matthews asserted that Olympus 
owes him $100,000 for his services as a real estate agent in connection with 
Olympus's purchase of real property in Summit County in 1998. 
C. The face of the "Notice of Claim" form on which Matthews asserted 
his claim indicates that by signing and filing the claim, Matthews was swearing 
and attesting "to the truthfulness and accuracy" of the claim under penalty of 
perjury. 
D. The "Notice of Claim" form clearly identifies "David C. Matthews" 
as the "Creditor," which the form defines as the "person or other entity to whom 
Olympus owes money or property." 
E. Nothing on the face of the Matthews Claim or in any of the 
documents Matthews submitted to the Receiver as attachments to the claim 
indicates that the alleged $100,000 real estate commission was promised or owed 
to any person or entity other than Matthews in his direct, individual capacity. 
F. After investigating the grounds for the Matthews Claim, the 
Receiver determined that the claim was meritless. 
G. The Receiver sent a letter dated October 6, 2004 to Matthews' 
counsel requesting that Matthews withdraw his claim and specifically notifying 
Matthews that if he did not, the Receiver intended to "proceed with litigation in 
the Receivership Court to obtain summary disallowance of the Matthews Claim" 
and would seek "court costs and attorneys fees from Mr. Matthews to the extent 
allowed by law." 
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H. The Receiver incurred substantial attorney fees on behalf of 
Olympus in various reasonable efforts to oppose the Matthews Claim, including 
(but not limited to) attempting to convince Matthews to withdraw the claim 
without litigation, successfully opposing Matthews5 motion to compel immediate 
payment of the claim, formally opposing the claim pursuant to the court-approved 
claim resolution procedures in effect in this Receivership, and successfully 
prosecuting a summary judgment motion and obtaining a ruling disallowing the 
claim as a matter of law. 
I. On May 12, 2005, Matthews filed his Amended Claim Response 
(the "Claim Response") addressing the Receiver's formal objection to the 
Matthews Claim. 
J. Nothing in the Claim Response indicated that the Matthews Claim 
was based on an assignment of a claim held by a real estate broker named Fred B. 
Law. 
K. Matthews contended that the documents submitted to the Receiver in 
connection with the Matthews Claim "clearly establish the existence of a broker 
relationship between Mr. Matthews and Olympus." Claim Response at 2-3. 
L. Matthews asserted that Olympus "agreed to pay Mr. Matthews a 
$100,000 commission" (Claim Response at 3), that the claimed $100,000 
commission "represents compensation for services provided by Mr. Matthews" 
(Claim Response at 3), that Matthews "performed valuable services in conjunction 
with the acquisition of the subject real property in reliance upon the agreement to 
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pay Mr. Matthews $100,000 in exchange for such services" (Claim Response at 
7), that "the agreement to pay Mr. Matthews $100,000 was made . . . as an 
inducement for Mr. Matthews to provide services" (Claim Response at 8), and that 
"Mr. Matthews did not have a cognizable action against Olympus until Olympus 
breached its promise to pay Mr. Matthews the $100,000" (Claim Response at 9). 
M. Matthews attempted to avoid the preclusive effect of the Utah statute 
of frauds by arguing, contrary to governing case law and without any supporting 
citations to the contrary, that the commission amount was not an essential contract 
term and need not be in writing. 
N. Matthews argued that the statute of frauds did not apply because of a 
limited exception under Utah case law that only applies when a defendant has 
admitted, either in pleadings or under oath, that an oral contract exists. 
O. Matthews knew that neither Olympus nor the Receiver ever admitted 
the existence of the alleged oral contract in any pleading or in any sworn 
statement. 
P. Matthews had more than six years after the alleged oral promise was 
made in late 1998 to obtain a sworn statement from an authorized representative of 
Olympus as evidence of the alleged promise, but he failed to do so. 
Q. Matthews admitted that his attempt to obtain a signed writing from 
Richard Jaffa to evidence the alleged oral promise was unsuccessful. 
R. After the Receiver raised the effect of the Utah broker commission 
statutes, Matthews attempted to avoid the preclusive effect of the statutes by 
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arguing, contrary to his original position, that he was an assignee of a claim 
belonging to a principal broker and that he could pursue the assignor's claim in his 
own name. 
S. In Request No. 14 of the Receiver's Requests for Admission 
pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 36, Matthews admitted the following: "Admit that 
your filing of the Matthews Claim and related papers in the receivership court is 
an attempt by you to obtain payment of the real estate commission from someone 
other than a principal broker." 
T. In Request No. 16, Matthews admitted the following: "Admit that 
Re-Max Brokers, L.C. was the principal brokerage with which you were affiliated 
during the period August 1998 through December 1998." 
U. In Interrogatory No. 4 of the Receiver's Interrogatories propounded 
to Matthews pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 33, Matthews identified all principal 
brokers with whom he was affiliated, and Matthews stated, in relevant part: "Jane 
Matthews principal broker in 1998." Matthews made no mention of Fred B. Law 
as his principal broker. 
V. In Interrogatory No. 6, Matthews identified "all persons who may 
have information concerning the Matthews Claim," including the names of twelve 
specific individuals, but did not list Fred B. Law. 
W. In response to the Receiver's Requests for Production of Documents 
made to Matthews pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 34, the only document Matthews 
produced was a copy of a one-page "Certificate of Licensure" issued by the Utah 
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Division of Real Estate concerning the real estate license of David C. Matthews, 
which Certificate clearly indicates that Matthews was licensed as an Associate 
Broker of "Re-Max Brokers" from February 1998 to March 1999, and did not 
become affiliated with "Re-Max Town & Country" until February 2001. 
X. The Certificate is consistent with Matthews' response to Request for 
Admission No. 16 noted above, but is inconsistent with the false statements in his 
affidavit discussed below. 
Y. In his response to Request for Admission No. 6, Matthews admitted 
that at all relevant times he was "bound by the Utah statutes and administrative 
rules applicable to licensed real estate associate brokers." 
Z. In response to Request No. 10, Matthews admitted that he 
"personally asked Richard Jaffa to provide [to Matthews] a signed document 
indicating that Olympus had agreed to pay [Matthews] a $100,000 real estate 
commission in connection with Olympus's purchase of the Property in December 
1998, but he [Jaffa] refused to do so." 
AA. In the Receiver's initial memorandum filed July 6, 2005 in support 
of her summary judgment motion, the Receiver argued that the Matthews Claim 
was barred as a matter of law by the Utah statute of frauds and also by Utah real 
estate commission statutes. 
BB. In Matthew's Notice of Claim, which he signed under penalty of 
perjury on June 7, 2004, in Matthew's Claim Response filed May 12, 2005, and in 
Matthew's sworn and binding answers to the Receiver's written discovery 
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requests, Matthews stated unequivocally that the alleged oral promise to pay a 
$100,000 commission was made by Olympus directly to him and gave rise to a 
payment obligation Olympus owed directly to him. 
CC. On August 12, 2005, when Matthews filed his memorandum in 
opposition to summary judgment and related affidavits (after the Receiver pointed 
out that under Utah law only a principal broker could pursue a commission claim 
against Olympus), Matthews stated under oath that the alleged oral promise 
actually was made not to him but to "Re/Max Town and Country," and that his 
wife, as the principal broker of "Re/Max Town and Country," had assigned the 
claim to him. 
DD. On October 20, 2005, when Matthews filed his "Supplemental 
Memorandum" and related affidavits (after the Receiver pointed out the false 
statements in the two prior affidavits), Matthews changed his story again by 
asserting that it was not actually his wife who was the principal broker entitled to 
assert the claim against Olympus, but Fred B. Law, who had orally assigned the 
claim to Matthews' wife, who later orally assigned the claim to Matthews. 
EE. On August 12, 2005, Matthews filed his Memorandum in 
Opposition to the Receiver's motion for summary judgment, and in support 
thereof, he also filed the Affidavit of David C. Matthews (the "David Matthews 
Affidavit") and the Affidavit of Jane Astle Matthews (the "Jane Matthews 
Affidavit"). 
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FF. The David Matthews Affidavit contains false statements that directly 
contradict Matthews' prior representations and statements made under penalty of 
perjury including in paragraph 4 of the affidavit wherein Matthews states that in 
1998, he and his wife owed a real estate brokerage company in Park City named 
"Re/Max Town and Country," and that his wife was the principal broker. 
GG. The Certificate of Licensure in Matthews' own possession that he 
produced in response to the Receiver's document request clearly shows that 
Matthews did not become affiliated with Re-Max Town & Country until February 
2001, more than two years after the December 1998 transaction. 
HH. The statement in paragraph 4 of the Matthews Affidavit directly 
contradicts Matthews' answer to Request for Admission No. 16. 
II. In paragraphs 8 and 9 of the David Matthews Affidavit, Matthews 
states, that the alleged promise by Olympus to pay a $100,000 commission was 
made directly "to Re/Max" rather than to Matthews personally. 
JJ. Paragraph 12 of the David Matthews Affidavit states that Matthews' 
pursuit of the $100,000 commission "has been in my capacity as the assignee from 
my wife of the Commission," which statement directly contradicts the statements 
Matthews made under penalty of perjury on the face of the Matthews Claim and 
his other statements and representations alleging that the $100,000 commission 
was promised to him personally and earned by him personally, and that he was 
pursuing the claim in his own right and in his own name as the "Creditor" to 
whom Olympus owed the money. 
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KK. The Jane Matthews Affidavit contains similar false statements 
concerning Jane Matthews5 alleged status as the principal broker of Re/Max Town 
and Country in 1998. 
LL. The false statements in the David Matthews Affidavit and the Jane 
Matthews Affidavit caused the Receiver to incur additional legal fees, including 
but not limited to those incurred in investigating the new allegations, obtaining a 
Certificate of Licensure concerning Jane Matthews, and pointing out those false 
statements to this Court in the Receiver's reply memorandum in support of 
summary judgment. 
MM. Nearly two months after the Receiver's reply memorandum was 
served, and only three business days before the summary judgment hearing, 
Matthews served a second "Affidavit of Jane Astle Matthews" admitting that her 
prior affidavit contained false statements, admitting that "Re-Max Brokers, L.C." 
(not Re/Max Town and Country) was the brokerage with which she and Matthews 
were associated in 1998, and admitting that she was not a principal broker at the 
relevant time. 
NN. Although the new affidavit of Jane Matthews contradicted and 
purportedly corrected some of her prior sworn statements regarding these facts, no 
new affidavit for David Matthews was submitted to withdraw or amend his own 
false affidavit on these same points. 
0 0 . The only affidavit of David Matthews on file with this Court 
contains materially false statements that Matthews knows are false. 
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PP. In addition to purporting to correct prior false statements in her 
affidavit, the new affidavit of Jane Matthews stated that an individual named Fred 
B. Law was the principal broker with which both she and Matthews were affiliated 
in 1998, and that Mr. Law had assigned the $100,000 commission claim to Jane 
Matthews, who in turn assigned the claim to Matthews. 
QQ. Matthews filed the new affidavit of Jane Matthews on October 20, 
2005 along with his "Supplemental Memorandum." 
RR. In the "Supplemental Memorandum," Matthews adopted his new 
"Fred Law assignment" theory as the basis for his claim, and he also included an 
affidavit of Fred B. Law. 
SS. In late October 2005, less than 3 business days before the summary 
judgment hearing and more than 16 months after Matthews signed the Matthews 
Claim under penalty of perjury, Matthews asserted for the first time that the 
$100,000 claim he was pursuing against Olympus was actually a claim of Remax 
Brokers, L.C., with Fred B. Law as principal broker that Matthews held only by 
way of an indirect, double oral assignment. 
TT. The Receiver incurred additional fees responding to the untimely 
and unauthorized Supplemental Memorandum and related supplemental affidavits. 
UU. At the conclusion of the summary judgment hearing held October 
24, 2005, this Court disallowed the Matthews Claim and ailed that the claim was 
barred as a matter of law by the Utah statute of frauds and applicable provisions of 
Utah real estate commission statutes. 
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W . The actions taken by Matthews in support of the Matthews Claim 
were solely for the purpose of causing delay and needlessly increasing the cost of 
this litigation. 
WW. Matthews' improper actions in pursuing the Matthews' Claim were 
motivated by his financial desire of $100,000, as sought by the Matthews' Claim. 
R.3122. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
It had been conclusively established that Matthews's Claim in this case is without 
merit and barred by Utah law. Nevertheless, Matthews argues, based upon a perceived 
technicality in a permissive statutory procedure that was not adopted by the district court, 
that the Receiver must pay his meritless and false claim. However, the court of appeals 
correctly ruled that the district court was entitled to consider the substantive merits of the 
Matthews Claim. The district court correctly ruled that section 48-2c-1305 is permissive 
in nature and was not applicable to the claims resolution procedure that the district court 
had established in this case. In other words, the district court properly interpreted its own 
bar date order as not having implemented a claims resolution procedure under section 
1305 but as having decided that the district court would establish a claims resolution 
procedure at a later date. Therefore, the court of appeals did not err in affirming the 
judgment of the district court. The court of appeals also affirmed the mling of the district 
court on the alternative basis that in a judicial receivership case a court of equity may 
extend deadlines for objections to claims. 
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In addition, the district court awarded attorney fees because Matthews's claim for 
an alleged oral real estate commission that was allegedly twice orally assigned was both 
without merit and in bad faith. Matthews filed a claim that he knew or should have 
known was without merit, asserting under penalty of perjury that the claim was his own 
claim (rather than someone else's claim that had been assigned to him). Then, after the 
Receiver moved for summary judgment, Matthews filed false affidavits of both himself 
and his spouse in an effort to avoid the effect of the real estate commission statute and the 
statute of frauds. These affidavits contradicted Matthews's own prior sworn Claim and 
his sworn discovery responses. 
Further, because Matthews asserted positions contrary to established Utah law, the 
district court correctly ruled, and the court of appeals correctly affirmed, that Matthews's 
claim for an oral modification of a contract for a real estate commission in the amount of 
$100,000 was barred by the statute of frauds. In addition, the district court correctly 
found, and the court of appeals correctly affirmed, that Matthews was barred from 
pursuing the claim for a real estate commission because he was not the real estate broker 
for the real estate transaction and that two alleged oral assignments were irrelevant under 
that statute. Fees for a claim without merit and filed in bad faith were appropriate. Fees 
were also appropriate under Rule 56(g) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The court 
of appeals did not err in affirming the district court's award of attorney fees to the 
Receiver and in imposing fees for the appeal. 
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ARGUMENT 
This case involves numerous issues, only two of which are before this Court for 
review.3 The first issue on which this Court granted Matthews's petition for a writ of 
certiorari centers on the holding of the court of appeals that a district court has the power 
to extend deadlines in cases before it. Although this was not the basis for the decision of 
the district court, the court of appeals was free to affirm the decision of the district court 
on any basis. Whether this Court decides to affirm the decision of the court of appeals on 
the particular reasoning of that court or on the reasoning of the district court, this Court 
should rule that the court of appeals was correct to affirm the decision of the district court 
in this case. As explained below, the LLC Act is permissive in nature, and the provisions 
of the LLC Act upon which Matthews relies did not control the disposition of Matthews's 
claim. 
The second issue that this Court agreed to review was whether the court of appeals 
erred in affirming the district court's award of attorney fees and in awarding the Receiver 
her attorney fees on appeal. As to this issue, there is a final determination in this case 
that Matthews 's Claim should never have been filed in the first place because it is barred 
by the statute of frauds and by Utah's real estate statutes and because the claim, which 
was filed under penalty of perjury, contained false information. In addition, Matthews 
submitted successive false affidavits and provided false statements under oath in this case 
in order to promote a constantly changing story in an attempt to get his meritless and 
This Court did not agree to review the opinion of the court of appeals that Matthews's 
claim was barred by the statute of frauds and by Utah's real estate statutes. 
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falsely filed claim allowed. The district court therefore did not err in awarding attorney 
fees in this case. 
Each of the two issues just described is analyzed more fully below. However, 
proper analysis of these issues requires an understanding of why Matthews's Claim was 
without merit and the reasons why it constituted bad faith for Matthews to file and pursue 
his Claim, including that the Matthews's allegations involving section 1305 would never 
have been an issue but for the wrongfully filed claim. Accordingly, the Receiver will 
first explain why Matthews's claim was without merit and filed in bad faith. 
I. MATTHEWS'S CLAIM WAS WITHOUT MERIT AND FILED IN BAD 
FAITH. 
Matthews's claim against Olympus was legally without merit and was filed and 
pursued in bad faith, as factually found by the district court, for two important reasons. 
First, the Claim was barred by the statute of frauds, and as a licensed real estate agent 
Matthews knew or should have known this. Second, under Utah law a claim for real 
estate commissions may be made only by a licensed real estate broker. Matthews knew 
or should have known this fact. Further, when the law in this regard was pointed out to 
him, Matthews should have withdrawn his Claim rather than doggedly pursuing it with 
false testimony to support his ever-changing story. 
A. MATTHEWS'S CLAIM IS BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF 
FRAUDS. 
It has now been conclusively established in this case that Matthews's Claim is 
barred by the statute of frauds. Even in his brief to this Court, Matthews admits that his 
claim for a real estate commission of $100,000 is based on "an oral modification of the 
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brokerage agreement whereby an agent of Olympus promised that Olympus would pay 
Mr. Matthews and his principal broker an additional $100,000 commission." Brief of 
Appellant ("Matthews's Brief) at 29 (emphasis added). As the court of appeals 
explained in this case, '"a broker [or agent] must be presumed to know that an oral 
contract of employment for rendition of services in negotiating a sale of real estate for a 
commission is invalid."' 2007 UT App |13 (quoting Machan Hampshire Props,, Inc. v. 
Western Real Estate & Dev. Co., 779 P.2d 230, 234 n.8 (Utah Ct. App. 1989 (bracketed 
material added by court of appeals). 
Because Matthews was "presumed to know" the law in this regard, he never 
should have filed his Claim in the first place. Nonetheless, Matthews doggedly insisted 
the statute of frauds did not apply because of a limited exception under Utah case law that 
applies only in the narrow circumstance in which a defendant has admitted "in the 
pleadings" or "at trial" that an oral contract exists. See Matthews's Brief at 29 (quoting 
L.P. Bentley v. Potter, 694 P.2d 617, 621 (Utah 1984)). Matthews knew that neither 
Olympus nor the Receiver ever admitted the existence of the alleged oral contract in any 
pleading or at trial. Matthews had more than six years after the alleged oral promise was 
made in late 1998 to obtain a sworn statement from an authorized representative of 
Olympus as evidence of the alleged promise, but he failed to do so. Matthews admits 
under penalty of perjury in his discovery responses that he attempted to obtain—and was 
unsuccessful in obtaining—a signed writing from Richard Jaffa4 to evidence the alleged 
The Receiver does not admit that Richard Jaffa was an authorized representative of 
Olympus, but even if he was, Matthews never obtained any written evidence (sworn or 
unsworn) from Richard Jaffa. 
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oral promise. Unable to obtain any admissible evidence of the alleged oral agreement, 
Matthews simply relied on his own self-serving testimony. As the court of appeals 
correctly held in this case, the judicial-admission exception to the statute of frauds "does 
not apply when the party making the claim simply asserts the admission" himself. 2007 
UTAPP 361,112. 
In short, Matthews never should have filed his Claim in the first place, nor should 
he have pursued it for as long as he has. 
B. MATTHEWS'S CLAIM IS UNLAWFUL UNDER UTAH REAL 
ESTATE STATUTES, 
Not only is Matthews's Claim barred by the statute of frauds, it has been 
conclusively established that the claim is unlawful under Utah real estate statutes that are 
designed to protect a seller of property from being subjected to multiple claims for a real 
estate commission. Utah law specifically prohibits a real estate sales agent or associate 
broker from "suing in his own name" or commencing "any action" for the recovery of a 
fee, commission, or compensation concerning the purchase or sale of real estate, as 
follows: 
No sales agent or associate broker may sue in his own name for the recovery of 
a fee, commission, or compensation for services as a sales agent or associate 
broker . . . . Any action for the recovery of a fee, commission, or other 
compensation may only be instituted and brought by the principal broker with 
whom the sales agent or associate broker is affiliated. 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-18(2) (emphasis added). It was undisputed in the district court 
that Matthews was at all relevant times an "associate broker" (License No. 5452612-
AB00) and not a "principal broker." In filing his claim, Matthews was trying to recover a 
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commission directly from a seller of real estate for his services as an associate broker. 
Thus, his claim is illegal under Utah law. 
After the Receiver moved for summary judgment on the ground that Matthews's 
Claim was unlawful, Matthews changed his story to say that the alleged oral promise to 
pay a $100,000 commission actually was made not to him but to "Re/Max Town and 
Country," and that his spouse, as the principal broker of "Re/Max Town and Country," 
had orally assigned the claim to him. When the Receiver pointed out that Matthews did 
not become affiliated with Re-Max Town & Country until February 2001, more than two 
years after the December 1998 transaction, Matthews submitted a last-minute 
"Supplemental Memorandum" and new affidavits in which changed his story yet again 
by asserting that it was not actually his spouse who was the principal broker entitled to 
assert the claim against Olympus, but Fred B. Law, who had orally assigned the claim to 
Matthews's spouse, who later orally assigned the claim to Matthews. 
The constant changes in Matthews's story illustrated that not only should the claim 
never have been filed, but also that it was doggedly pursued in bad faith based on false 
affidavits and false sworn statements. Nevertheless, Matthews argues that, based upon a 
statutory provision not adopted by the district court, the Receiver must pay his unlawful 
Claim in full. For the reasons set forth below, this Court should affirm the holding of the 
court of appeals that the district court was entitled to reach the merits of Matthews's 
claim. 
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II. THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE DISTRICT 
COURT WAS ENTITLED TO RESOLVE MATTHEWS'S CLAIM ON THE 
MERITS. 
As established above, Matthews has never had a legitimate claim against 
Olympus. Not only is his claim barred by the statute of frauds and Utah's real estate 
statutes, the claim was submitted in bad faith and supported by materially false 
statements under oath. Under these circumstances, there is no "claim" to either allow or 
object to, and the particular provisions of section 1305 upon which Matthews so heavily 
relies simply do not apply. Stated another way, the law does not recognize Matthews's 
Claim, and he cannot take advantage of a hypertechnical argument to obtain money that 
he is admittedly not legally entitled to collect. However, as shown below, even if the 
Court considers Matthews's arguments regarding section 1305, the Court should still 
affirm the decision of the court of appeals because Matthews's arguments about section 
1305 are incorrect, as the district court had authority either to establish deadlines other 
than those set forth in the permissive section 1305, or, as the court of appeals decided, to 
extend the deadlines found in section 1305. 
A. MATTHEWS DOES NOT HAVE A "CLAIM" UNDER SECTION 
1305. 
In his brief to this Court Matthews insists on application of section 1305 of the 
LLC Act to the exclusion of the alternative claims adjudication procedures ordered by the 
district court. The problem with Matthews's argument is that application of all of the 
provisions of section 1305 establishes that Matthews does not even have a claim under 
section 1305 in the first place. As explained below, if section 1305 is applied here, there 
is nothing that can be "considered approved." 
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As pointed out above, the district court did not (and was not required to) adopt 
section 1305, including the provision in section 1305(4) that if "claims" are not 
"rejected" within ninety days, they "shall be considered approved." Is is important to 
note, however, that the district court also did not adopt section 1305's definition of what 
constitutes a claim. The procedures established by the district court allowed for 
contingent and unmatured claims (such as the Matthews Claim) to be filed with the 
Court. However, if as Matthews suggests, the district court had no alternative but to 
strictly apply (without picking and choosing) the provisions of section 1305, then the 
district court would have been required to strictly apply the definition of "claim" in 
section 1305 and would not have been permitted to define "claim" more broadly than in 
the statute. 
Under the language of section 1305, Matthews did not have a "claim" for two 
important reasons. First, as pointed out above, Matthews's Claim is unlawful and barred 
by law. An illegal demand for payment supported by later-filed false affidavits does not 
rise to the level of a "claim" under section 1305. Otherwise, section 1305 would become 
a free pass for fraudulent and illegal demands for payments from dissolved companies. 
In addition, section 1305(6) states, "For purposes of this section, 'claim' does not 
include a contingent liability or a claim based on an event occurring after the effective 
date of dissolution." The purpose of this provision is to freeze the rights and liabilities of 
a company as of the date that a court orders dissolution. Thus, under section 1305, in 
order for Matthews to have a valid claim against Olympus, he must have had a right to 
demand payment as of the date of dissolution of Olympus. Cf. McFarling v. Demco, Inc., 
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546 P.2d 625, 628 (Okla. 1976) (rights become fixed with appointment of receiver for 
insolvent insurance company). In this case, Matthews's claim was admittedly contingent. 
Even if his allegation is correct that he was promised $100,000 if and when the property 
was sold, the property was not sold as of the effective date of dissolution in this case but 
only later as part of the dissolution itself.5 Therefore, Matthews's Claim was both 
"contingent" and "based on an event occurring after the effective date of dissolution." It 
is therefore not a "claim" under section 1305, and the provisions of section 1305 about 
certain "claims" being "considered approved" are simply inapplicable in this case. 
Matthews accuses the Receiver of wanting to pick and choose among the provisions of 
section 1305. In fact it is Matthews who is trying to pick and choose. The Receiver's 
position is that the provisions of section 1305 are permissive and that the district court 
was within its authority to order alternative procedures in this judicial proceeding. If, 
however, section 1305 must be applied, then Matthews is not allowed to take advantage 
of the more liberal definition of "claim" adopted by the district court in its procedures. 
Because this Court may affirm the decision of the court of appeal for any reason that 
appears on the record, the Court should affirm the court of appeals for this reason alone 
5
 The Order of Decree of Judicial Dissolution was entered in this case on August 21, 
2002. R. 589-91. The sale of the real property that gives rise to Matthews's claim for 
an additional commission did not occur until December 7, 2004, over two years later. 
See Order Authorizing Sale of Silverado Property, R. 1061-67. Indeed, not only did 
Matthews not have a matured noncontingent claim as of the date of dissolution, he did 
not even have such a claim when he filed his notice of claim on June 30, 2004, because 
even accepting Matthews's argument that there was an oral agreement to pay him a 
$100,000 commission, the alleged obligation to pay that commission admittedly did not 
arise unless and until the property was sold. 
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and does not need to consider the legal arguments discussed in the next section of this 
brief. 
B. THE DISTRICT COURT WAS ENTITLED TO CONSIDER 
MATTHEWS'S CLAIM ON THE MERITS, 
In an effort to avoid substantive review of his falsely filed and meritless claim, 
Matthews argued to the district court that—despite the statute of frauds and the statutory 
prohibition against collection of commissions by agents—his claim must be "considered 
approved" pursuant to section 1305(4).6 Specifically, in an attempt to prevent the district 
court from addressing his claim on the merits,7 (and after having failed to object to the 
motion to establish a claims bar date and claims filing procedure which stated that a 
subsequent motion to set a claims adjudication procedure would be filed), Matthews 
argued that the district court lacked authority to establish any claims procedure that did 
not mirror exactly section 48-2c-1305(4), a permissive provision of the LLC Act. 
However, as explained below, Matthews's argument ignores (1) the permissive nature of 
the procedures set forth in sections 1305 and 1306 of the LLC Act, (2) the district court's 
broad authority to establish procedures for adjudicating claims of a company in 
6
 The statute does not define what it means when a claim is "considered approved." The 
Receiver submits that an analogy to bankruptcy law is appropriate and that, at most, 
"considered approved" should be construed to mean only that a rebuttal presumption 
exists that the filed claim is "prima facie evidence of the validity and amount of the 
claim." See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3001(f). In the bankruptcy context, a proof of claim is 
"deemed allowed, unless a party in interest. . . objects." 11 U.S.C. § 502(a). If an 
objection is filed to a claim that was otherwise "deemed allowed," then the bankruptcy 
court determines the allowance of the claim. 11 U.S.C. § 502(b). Thus, even if 
Matthews's claim was "considered approved," the court had the right to adjudicate the 
allowance of the claim. 
"7 
Matthews argues to this Court that his claim "should have been paid without any further 
inquiry." Matthews's Brief at 15. 
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receivership under the supervision of the court, and (3) the fact that but for the filing of a 
meritless claim predicated on false information submitted under penalty of perjury, no 
discussion of section 1305 of the LLC Act would even be reached. The court of appeals 
determined that the permissive provisions of section 48-2c-1305 injudicial dissolutions 
and the equitable powers of a receivership permit an extension of a statutory period to 
"reject" claims. 2007 UT App. 361, 173 P.3d 192, f 18. The holding of the district court 
was different. The district court properly held that the Successor Receiver Order did not 
employ the permissive provisions of sections 1305 and 1306 of the LLC Act to adjudicate 
claims, but instead ordered that claims would be adjudicated by the district court itself. 
R. 2145. Regardless of which reasoning this Court chooses to follow, it should affirm the 
holding of the court of appeals. 
The district court's authority to appoint a receiver was based on its "inherent 
equitable power." Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, fflf 50-51. Moreover, "[a] receivership 
is an equitable matter and is entirely within the control of the court." Interlake Co. v. Von 
Hake, 697 P.2d 238, 239 (Utah 1985). While, the Successor Receiver Order refers to the 
possibility that the Receiver may use certain provisions of the LLC Act, that act is 
permissive in nature and does not mandate that a court adopt any or all of its procedures. 
In this case, the district court did not adopt certain permissive procedures of the LLC Act, 
nor did it adopt procedures with time periods shorter than those provided for in the LLC 
Act. The court's order specifically provides: "Nothing in this Order shall prevent the 
Receiver from requesting augmentation, modification, or supplementation of her powers 
as Receiver to the fall extent permitted by law or equity upon further application to the 
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Court and after notice and hearing." R. 771 at Tf 12 (emphasis added). Even under the 
LLC Act, "[t]he court appointing a receiver or custodian has exclusive jurisdiction over 
the company and all of its property wherever located," Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-1212(l) 
and the court "shall describe the powers and duties of the receiver or custodian in its 
appointing order, which may be amended from time to time," id. at § 1212(3). Further, 
after a decree of dissolution is entered for a judicially dissolving company, the court is to 
direct "the winding up and liquidation of the company's business and affairs in 
accordance with Part 13" of the LLC Act. Id. at § 1213(2) (emphasis added). Thus, a 
receivership court, exercising its exclusive jurisdiction, has broad discretion in overseeing 
the receivership and dissolution of a limited liability company, and it may grant 
appropriate powers to the receiver and establish appropriate procedures for the winding 
up and liquidation of the company as long as they are "in accordance with" Part 13 of the 
LLC Act. The district court did exactly that. 
The winding up and liquidation procedures of Part 13 of the LLC Act provide that 
"there is no fixed time period for completion of winding up a dissolved company" except 
that it should be completed "within a reasonable time under the circumstances," id. 
§ 1301, and they give a dissolving company power to "settle or compromise . . . claims 
brought against... the company," id. § 1302(3), and to "settle disputes by mediation, 
arbitration, or court action" id. § 1302(8) (emphasis added). Neither a receivership nor a 
judicial dissolution proceeding is required by the LLC Act. Sections 1305 and 1306 of 
the LLC Act provide certain procedures that a dissolving company "may" use in 
disposing of claims, but by the plain language of the statute that Matthews contends 
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applies, those procedures are permissive, not mandatory. See id. §§ 1305(1), 1306(1). 
Consistent with and in accordance with the LLC Act, the Successor Receiver Order 
provides permissively that the Receiver "may accept or reject claims as provided in Utah 
Code Ann. § 48-2c-1305 and 1306" but mandatorily directs that "[t]o the extent permitted 
by law, all claims filed against Olympus shall be adjudicated and determined by this 
Court in and as part of this proceeding." Id. at f 4 (emphasis added; cited and discussed 
in the Claim Procedures Motion). Thus, pursuant to its equitable powers, the district 
court specifically granted the Receiver discretion whether to recommend to the district 
court whether to use or not use the provisions of sections 1305 and 1306, with the 
mandatory proviso that all claims filed against Olympus be "adjudicated and determined 
by this Court." The reason that the Receiver suggested that all claims be adjudicated by 
the court and the reason that the district court adopted this approach, was that the issues 
in this judicial receivership were contentious and divisive. Virtually all of the claims 
against the receivership estate invoked the partisanship of one member group or the other. 
Thus, the district court chose to keep control over the allowance and disallowance of 
every claim. The district court was legally entitled to do so. The fact that section 1305 is 
permissive means that there are other ways to deal with claims, particularly in a court-
supervised receivership. As explained below, that is exactly what the district court did 
here—it chose another way to deal with the claims against Olympus. 
Specifically, pursuant to the Successor Receiver Order, the Receiver first sought 
and obtained the Bar Date Order to establish a claims bar date and claims filing 
procedures, which provisions were not inconsistent with sections 1305 and 1306. 
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Specifically, the Receiver stated that she would later request procedures for the resolution 
of claims that would be filed. Significantly, Matthews, who was served with the motion, 
did not oppose the motion to establish the bar date or the claims filing procedure, nor did 
he object to the proposed process under which the district court would later set 
procedures for determining claims. Neither did Matthews request in response to that 
motion that the trial court apply the provisions of section 1305 of the LLC Act to require 
rejection within 90 days. The Receiver did not propose (and the district court, in 
interpreting its own order, did not mandate) any of the procedures contained in sections 
1305 and 1306 and specifically did not mandate any procedures contained in section 
1305 and 1306 for resolving claims filed pursuant to the Bar Date Order. 
Matthews argues multiple provisions of the memorandum in support of the Bar 
Date Order as support for his position that the rejection provisions of section 1305 apply 
to the Matthews claim. However, Matthews ignores the specific statement of the 
Receiver that she would later file a motion to establish a claims adjudication process. R. 
797 at f 12. Matthews also ignores the explicit language of the district court order that 
"all claims filed against Olympus shall be adjudicated and determined by this Court in 
and as part of this proceeding." Successor Receiver Order f^ 4. Thus, the Receiver had 
no authority to "reject" or otherwise determine claims without adjudication by the court. 
The Receiver relied upon that order, to which Matthews did not object. Thereafter, the 
Receiver sought and obtained the Claims Resolution Order. 
Matthews's argument based on section 48-2c-1305 ignores the threshold issue of 
whether that statute even applies. In this case, the controlling provisions are contained in 
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the district court's Bar Date Order. That order does not adopt (or even refer to) any part 
of section 1305, much less state that claims must be rejected or resolved pursuant to that 
statute. In fact, because the Successor Receiver Order requires all filed claims to be 
"adjudicated and determined by [the district court]" and the Bar Date Order addresses 
only the claim filing procedure, the Receiver had no authority to "accept or reject" claims 
without obtaining further order(s) of the district court. 
In addition, Matthews was properly and timely served with notice that the 
Receiver intended to deal with claims against Olympus in two well-defined steps, 
consistent with the district court's prior orders. First, the Receiver would obtain court 
approval for a claims bar date and claims filing procedure. Second, only after she had 
obtained a claims bar date and claims filing procedure, and after she had the opportunity 
to review and analyze the filed claims and to try to settle or resolve claims, would the 
Receiver obtain approval from the court for specific procedures, tailored to the unique 
facts of this case, for adjudicating the remaining claims. Matthews was well aware of the 
Receiver's two-step approach, yet he failed to assert any timely objection. Only when the 
Receiver relied upon the Successor Receiver Order that claims would be adjudicated by 
the district court and carried out in accordance with the second of the two steps did 
Matthews object to the two-step approach and seek a windfall to have his meritless claim 
"considered approved." Therefore the district court did not err in considering Matthews's 
Claim on the merits. 
The court of appeals alternatively determined that the trial court as a court of 
equity in this receivership proceeding had authority to extend the deadlines for the 
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rejection of claims. This holding is also correct and should be affirmed by this Court. 
Matthews argues that section 1305 is like a statute of limitations and that the district court 
did not have authority to vary from section 1305's deadlines. However, even if the 
district court had ordered the application of all of the permissive provisions of section 
1305 in this receivership case, the district court would still have been entitled to extend 
the deadline in this case. Unlike a statute of limitations, which is only used as a shield to 
bar stale claims, Matthews's interpretation of section 1305 would allow it to be used as a 
sword to enforce the payment of fraudulent claims. This is far different from a statute of 
limitations. In reality, what Matthews is arguing is more analogous to a default judgment 
than the bar of a claim by a statute of limitations. And the law regarding default 
judgments is clear. Judgments by default are not favored by the courts nor are they in the 
interests of justice or fair play. Heathman v.Fabian & Clendenan, 377 P.2d 189 (Utah 
1962). Indeed when any reasonable excuse is offered by the defaulting party courts 
generally tend to favor granting relief from the default judgment unless to do so would 
result in substantial prejudice or injustice to the adverse party. Westinghouse Elec. 
Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larsen, 544 P.2d 876 (Utah 1975). In this case, the district court 
did not adopt all of the permissive provisions of section 1305, and the deadlines of that 
section therefore do not apply. However, if this Court disagrees and determines that the 
deadlines are applicable, then the Court should affirm the decision of the court of appeals 
that the district court had the power to extend those deadlines. 
Matthews's motive in this case is facially transparent: he wants to have his 
$100,000 claim "considered approved" and "paid without any further inquiry55 from the 
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assets of the Receivership estate, without permitting any scrutiny of the merits of his 
alleged orally twice-assigned oral real estate commission claim by the Receiver, the 
members and creditors of Olympus, the district court (which found that the claim was 
meritless and filed in bad faith), and this Court. The mere filing of that claim was 
perjurious and, as the district court factually found, in bad faith. It would be improper to 
use a perceived technical aspect of a permissive statutory procedure that the trial court 
has held it did not adopt, to force the payment of a meritless and perjurious claim that 
was filed in bad faith. 
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY AFFIRMED THE DISTRICT 
COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES AND IMPOSED FEES FOR 
THE APPEAL. 
The court of appeals properly affirmed the districts court's decision that the 
Receiver was entitled to recover attorney fees in this case, and it correctly imposed fees 
for the appeal. 
First, the district court correctly ruled that the Receiver was entitled to attorney 
fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56. That statute provides in relevant part: 
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing 
party if the court determines that the action or defense to the action was without 
merit and not brought or asserted in good faith, ... 
In the context of section 78-27-56, "[wjhere a party has acted on a meritless claim and in 
bad faith, in most cases it would be inequitable not to award attorney fees." Wardley 
Better Homes and Gardens v. Cannon, 2002 UT 99, 61 P.3d 1009, ][ 31 (emphasis 
added). The district court judge in this case, the Honorable Tyrone E. Medley, carefully 
considered the facts and the law in rendering his opinion, and he properly ruled that the 
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Receiver was entitled to recover her reasonable attorney fees incurred in defending 
against Matthews's claim against Olympus because the claim was both without merit and 
pursued in bad faith. The fees were also awarded pursuant to Rule 56(g) based upon 
Matthews's bad faith and an intent to delay. 
A. Without Merit 
A claim is "without merit" if it is "frivolous" or "of little weight or importance 
having no basis in law or fact." Warner v. DMG Color, Inc., 2000 UT 102, 20 P.3d 868, 
U 22. The court of appeals did not err in finding that the Matthews Claim was of "little 
weight" with "no basis in law or fact." 
Matthews's argument to this Court implies that the district court found that 
Matthews's statutory construction of Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-1305 was one of the 
arguments found to be without merit. Matthews's Brief at 23. In Judge Medley's careful 
fifteen pages of findings of fact and conclusions of law, however, neither section 1305 
nor any argument based thereon is ever mentioned. Matthews's arguments to the district 
court about section 1305 simply did not constitute any part of the district court's 
determination that the Matthews Claim is without merit and that attorney fees should 
therefore be awarded. Rather, the bases for the district court's "without merit" 
determination were the statute of frauds and Utah's real estate commission statutes, and 
the rulings of the district court and the court of appeals on these particular issues are not 
before this Court because the petition for a writ of certiorari was not granted on these 
issues. However, as pointed out above, Matthews's claim was barred by both the statute 
of frauds and Utah's real estate broker statutes. 
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Matthews argues that he had good faith arguments regarding both issues and that 
he should not be penalized simply because he lost. This argument misses the point. As 
to the statute of frauds, as pointed out above, Matthews knewr full well that there was no 
admission from Olympus. Indeed, he admits that he tried to obtain an affidavit from 
Richard Jaffa but was unsuccessful. 
As to the real estate commission statute, the wording of the Utah statute is clear 
and unmistakable: "No sales agent or associate broker may sue in his own name for 
recovery of a fee, commission, or compensation . . . ." Utah Code § Ann. 61-2-18(2). 
Matthews filed the proof of claim in this case in his own name, under penalty of perjury, 
for services he allegedly rendered, with no indication that he would later claim that the 
alleged $100,000 commission was actually owed to his spouse or to Fred Law, the 
principal broker. The very purpose of the statute is to protect a party such as the Receiver 
from paying a commission to an associate broker such as Matthews only to face the 
possibility that someone else, including a principal broker, could allege that the payment 
should have been made to him or her. For very good reason, Utah law requires that 
claims may be filed only by the principal broker. 
Moreover, contrary to Matthews's assertion, Utah appellate courts have addressed 
the broker commission statute at issue, Utah Code § 61-2-18, and have held that its plain 
language applies literally to prohibit a person who is not a licensed principal broker— 
Matthews—from suing a buyer or seller—Olympus—for a commission. In Young v. 
Buchanan, 259 P.2d 876 (Utah 1953), this Court held that even though a licensed real 
estate agent had an oral agreement with a licensed broker allowing the agent to work on 
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his own, including the right to collect and retain all commissions derived from the agent's 
efforts (similar to the alleged oral "assignment" on which Matthews relies in this case), 
the agent could not sue the real estate seller directly to recover a promised commission. 
Young, 259 P.2d at 876-878. The case was governed by a predecessor statute, but the 
court explained that the then-recently enacted section 61-2-18 was "indicative of the 
legislative spirit and intent" behind the prior statute. Id. at 878. In addressing section 61-
2-18, the court determined that it "prohibits any person or association from bringing an 
action for the recovery of any commission" for brokerage services unless the person was 
duly licensed as a real estate broker at the time the services were rendered. Id. The real 
estate agent even admitted in open court that "he could look only to a licensed broker for 
his commission," and thus tried to join the broker as an involuntary plaintiff, but the court 
rejected the attempt. Id. at 878-79. On appeal, Matthews attempts to distinguish the 
Young decision on the basis that no assignment was alleged, but he ignores the rationale 
of this Court. 
In addition, in Morris v. John Price Assocs., Inc., 590 P.2d 315 (Utah 1979), the 
Utah Supreme Court vacated a judgment in favor of a real estate agent for a commission 
and held that the "trial court should have granted the motion for dismissal" as to the 
agent's claim, because the language of section 61-2-18 was controlling. Morris, 590 P.2d 
at 316. Conversely, the court affirmed the judgment in favor of the agent's licensed 
principal broker, and held that "[wjhat the rights may be as between plaintiff [the agent] 
and his then employer [the principal broker] is something for them to adjust between 
themselves." Id. at 317. Thus, if there were a valid claim for a $100,000 real estate 
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commission arising from Olympus's purchase of the subject property in December 1998, 
only a licensed principal broker suing in its own name would have standing to sue 
Olympus for the commission. Matthews's assertion that he holds an oral assignment 
from his spouse who received an oral assignment from the principal broker does nothing 
to override the governing statutory language. See also Diversified Gen. Corp. v. White 
Barn Golf Course, Inc., 584 P.2d 848, 848, 852 (Utah 1978) (affirming summary 
judgment for defendant based on section 61-2-18 because plaintiff was not a licensed 
principal broker and thus could not sue for a commission for real estate services); 
AndalexRes., Inc. v. Myers, 871 P.2d 1041, 1044-45 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (affirming 
summary judgment for defendant based on section 61-2-18 against non-broker's claim 
for a real estate commission and holding that statute is unambiguous and applies literally 
to bar any claim against a buyer or seller for a commission by a person who does not 
have "the requisite broker license"). In fact, allowing pursuit of a commission based on 
an alleged oral assignment defeats the entire intent and purpose of the statute. 
Therefore, Matthews's argument that he is entitled to pursue collection of a 
commission from Olympus in his own name because a principal broker allegedly orally 
assigned rights to its commissions to Matthews's spouse, who then allegedly orally 
assigned the rights to Matthews, is contrary to the plain language of section 61-2-18 and 
governing Utah case law holding that section 61-2-18 must be applied literally. The 
court of appeals did not err in holding that the claim was without merit. 
This Court has not hesitated to uphold trial courts in ruling that claims with 
similarly weak or non-existent legal support were "without merit" and has permitted an 
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award of legal fees under section 78-27-56. See Wardley Better Homes and Gardens v. 
Cannon, 2002 UT 99, 61 P.3d 1009, t 30; Warner v. DMG Color, Inc., 2000 UT 102, 20 
P.3d 868, \ 22; Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 315 (Utah 1998) (holding that "a 
finding that a party has attempted to avoid liability by testifying falsely will support a 
decision to award attorney fees if combined with a finding of bad faith"). Advocacy is 
not chilled when fees are based on false affidavits filed to adjust the facts to the legal 
theory and when there is no legal basis asserted other than the argument that some sort of 
admission might be elicited at trial after written acknowledgement of the alleged 
commission had already been refused. 
B. In Bad Faith 
In his brief to this Court, Matthews does not refute the finding of bad faith by the 
trial court, and relies only on his argument that his claim had merit. Matthews's Brief at 
pp. 21-32. The bad faith finding is reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard, which 
Mathews appears to concede. 
This Court has ruled that in order to find that a party acted in "bad faith" for 
purposes of section 78-27-56: 
[T]he trial court must find that one or more of the following factors existed: (i) the 
party lacked an honest belief in the propriety of the activities in question; (ii) the 
party intended to take unconscionable advantage of others; or (iii) the party 
intended to or acted with the knowledge that the activities in question would 
hinder, delay, or defraud others. 
Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 316 (Utah 1998). Matthews's lack of an honest 
belief in the legal basis for his claim, and his knowledge that his pursuit of the claim 
would unjustly hinder and delay the Receiver in her attempts to administer and close the 
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Olympus receivership estate, is evidenced by his contradictory representations and 
admissions in the trial court. The bad faith is further evidenced by his arguments to this 
Court that his false sworn statements were an inadvertent mistake without a meaningful 
effect on the substantive arguments on the merits. The district court properly rejected 
this argument, and the court of appeals correctly affirmed. 
Moreover, Matthews knew (or was charged with knowing) that his claim was 
barred by the statute of frauds and the Utah broker commission statutes. Matthews 
admitted that he was a licensed associate broker at all relevant times and was bound to 
follow the governing statutes and regulations. While he submitted more that 100 pages 
of documents to the Receiver as support for his claim, he knew that nothing in any of 
those documents specified a $100,000 commission or an assignment thereof. As a 
licensed real estate professional, he was charged with knowledge that an alleged oral 
promise of a commission is unenforceable as a matter of law under the statute of frauds. 
"[A] broker must be presumed to know that an oral contract of employment for rendition 
of services in negotiating a sale of real estate for a commission is invalid." Machan 
Hampshire Props., Inc. v. Western Real Estate & Dev. Co., 779 P.2d 230, 234 (Utah 
App. 1989). As a Utah-licensed real estate professional, Matthews also should be 
charged with knowledge that under the plain language of governing Utah broker 
commission statutes, he was strictly prohibited from pursuing a claim in his own name 
against Olympus for a real estate commission. 
In Warner v. DMG Color, Inc., 2000 UT 102, f 23, this Court noted that the trial 
court had found "bad faith" under section 78-27-56 because the claims the plaintiff was 
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asserting "had been sold by the bankruptcy trustee to Defendants in compliance with the 
order of the United States Bankruptcy Court." This Court ruled that the bad faith finding 
was not clearly erroneous because the fact that "plaintiff knew of the sale and participated 
without objection in it, was certainly sufficient to raise the inference of bad faith on 
plaintiffs part." Similarly, in Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 316 (Utah 1998), the 
trial court found that the plaintiffs pursued their claims with "no other apparent reason 
than to harass . . . and/or to drive up the costs of litigation," and this Court held that the 
finding was enough to satisfy the "bad faith" element of section 78-27-56. 
Those cases support the finding made in this case that the Matthews Claim was not 
asserted or pursued in good faith, because Matthews's presumed knowledge of Utah law 
respecting commission agreements and commission collections, and his materially false 
and contradictory sworn statements, are "certainly sufficient to raise the inference of bad 
faith," and because Matthews has pursued his claim for "no other apparent reason" than 
to "drive up the costs of litigation" in trying to recover a claim he knew he was not 
entitled to even assert much less pursue. 
In addition to the foregoing, the district court properly ruled that the Receiver was 
entitled to attorney fees on the alternate ground that Matthews submitted affidavits in bad 
faith or solely for purposes of delay in violation of Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(g). 
Thus, even if the Receiver were not entitled to recover attorney fees pursuant to section 
78-27-56, she was entitled to recover those fees incurred as a result of the false affidavits 
Matthews filed on August 12, 2005, and October 20, 2005, in opposition to the 
Receiver's summary judgment motion. As noted above, it is undisputed that the August 
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12 affidavits contained false statements, and the October 20 affidavit contains statements 
that contradict Matthews's prior statements and representations, including those made in 
his Notice of Claim, his answers to discovery requests, and his Claim Response. Rule 56, 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, governing summary judgment proceedings, provides in 
relevant part: 
If any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are presented in bad 
faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order the party 
presenting them to pay to the other party the amount of the reasonable expenses 
which the filing of the affidavits caused, including reasonable attorney's fees. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(g). Because the two grounds for attorney fees under this rule are 
stated in the disjunctive, a showing of bad faith is not required if it is evident that the 
affidavits were presented "solely for the purpose of delay." In this case, both bad faith 
and an intent to delay are evident and were found present by Judge Medley in his detailed 
factual findings. 
Along with the summary judgment motion filed July 6, 2005, the Receiver 
submitted an affidavit with a certified record from the Utah Division of Real Estate 
establishing conclusively that Matthews was not a "principal broker" and therefore was 
not entitled to pursue a commission claim against Olympus. In response, Matthews filed 
the August 12 affidavits claiming that his wife, Jane Matthews, was the principal broker. 
In reply, the Receiver submitted a further affidavit with a certified record from the Utah 
Division of Real Estate establishing conclusively that Jane Matthews was not "principal 
broker" at the relevant time. Then, in connection with his unauthorized last minute 
"Supplemental Memorandum," Matthews filed two more affidavits on October 20 
purporting to establish, for the first time (and ignoring all of his prior sworn statements to 
45 
the contrary) that the oral promise for a $100,000 commission was actually a claim that 
initially belonged to principal broker Fred B. Law, who orally assigned it to Jane 
Matthews, who then orally assigned it to Matthews. This chain of events, if it does not 
establish bad faith, certainly establishes that Matthews presented the affidavits solely for 
the purpose of delay and to unjustly increase the costs of litigation. 
Although it appears there are no reported Utah cases discussing the relevant 
language of Utah Rule Civ. P. 56(g), the language of the comparable federal rule is nearly 
identical. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(g). Under the federal rule, numerous courts have held 
that sanctions are appropriate against a party submitting affidavits on summary judgment 
that contain false statements or material omissions. E.g., In re Gioioso, 979 F.2d 956, 
961-62 (3d Cir. 1992) (reversing lower court's refusal to award attorney fees and holding 
that because affidavits "flatly contradicted earlier sworn depositions" and "failed to raise 
material issues of fact," rule 56(g) "required" that fees be awarded); Modica v. United 
States, 518 F.2d 374, 376-77 and n.2 (5th Cir. 1975) (approving sanctions imposed by the 
trial court, apparently under rule 56(g), against a party who submitted an affidavit that 
was an "eleventh-hour denial of facts admitted over a three-year period"); Warshay v. 
Guinness PLC, 750 F. Supp. 628, 632 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (imposing rule 56(g) sanctions in 
action for breach of oral agreement, in part because plaintiff omitted material facts in his 
affidavit), affd, 935 F.2d 1278 (2d Cir. 1991); SMSAssocs. V. Clay, 868 F. Supp. 337, 
344 (D.D.C. 1994) (awarding attorney fees under Rule 56(g) against litigant for his 
Rule 56(g) does not require that a party prevail in order to receive an award of attorney 
fees. 
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"dilatory tactics/' "affidavits made in bad faith/' and "untrue representations under 
oath"), affd, 70 F.3d 638 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Barticheck v. Fidelity Union Bank 680 F. 
Supp. 144, 150 (D.NJ. 1998) (imposing rule 56(g) sanctions because plaintiff filed 
affidavit contradicting her prior deposition testimony); Cobell v. Norton, 214 F.R.D. 13, 
20 (D.D.C. 2003) (imposing rule 56(g) sanctions on defendants who filed "an affidavit 
containing material representations of fact that defendants knew to be false" because they 
"possessed a letter" showing contrary facts). In this case the facts that Matthews lied 
about were essential to his case because they dealt with whether an enforceable contract 
existed under the statute of frauds and whether the real estate commission statute barred 
Matthews from pursuing a claim in his own name. 
Based upon the foregoing, this Court should affirm the district court's decision to 
award attorney fees to the Receiver in this case. In addition, pursuant to Utah Rule of 
Appellate Procedure 33, the Court should award the Receiver her attorney fees on appeal 
on the basis that if the arguments below were without merit, the appeal is also necessarily 
without merit. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should rule that the court of appeals correctly 
affirmed the rulings of the district court in this matter. 
DATED this 12th day of May, 2008. 
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER P.C. 
Steven T. Waterman 
Brent D. Wride 
Steven C. Strong 
Attorneys for the Receiver 
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